Coordination failure and the high tech industry. by Yau, Cheuk Man. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
• f 
C O O R D I N A T I O N F A I L U R E 
A N D T H E H I G H T E C H I N D U S T R Y 
i 
Yau Cheuk Man 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Division of Economics 
of i 
.—- 1 
The Graduate School 
of 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
. in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
The Degree of Master of Philosophy i 
K 
August 1995 
j r  g  ,  8 1  m l  
s u t u s  
7 1  
Abstract 
This paper offers a possible explanation for the failure of an economy to establish 
the high tech industry. We present two models where the productivity of capital used 
in the high tech industry is dependent on the collective investment decision of capital 
owners. Hence it may be necessary to coordinate their investment so as to start the 
high tech production. Otherwise, the economy may specialize only in producing the 
traditional manufacturing good even though the high tech industry is viable. The 
coordination failure is shown to be likely to occur in the economies with moderate 
labor capital endowment ratio. Capital abundant countries can establish the high tech 
industry without coordination policy while in labor abundant countries, only traditional 
manufacturing industry is viable. This implication of the models is generally consistent 
with the production pattern in the real world. An investment subsidy, a production 
subsidy，a trade policy, a higher education subsidy and free provision of higher 
education are discussed as possible government policies for resolving the coordination 
failure. But it is uncertain whether the economic welfare can be improved through 
these policies since they may introduce some distortions to the economy. Under some 
circumstances, capital mobility also leads to the resolution of coordination failure. 
Lastly, an attempt is made to apply the models to the related issues in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
In Heckscher-Ohlin model, the factor endowment dictates the production 
pattern of an economy. Capital abundant countries have comparative advantage over 
capital intensive goods such as high tech good while labor abundant countries tend to 
produce labor intensive goods such as traditional manufacturing good. However, it is 
possible that countries still specialize in producing the traditional manufacturing good 
even when the high tech industry is viable. Hong Kong is an example. Since the 
1970s, traditional labor intensive industries such as textile and clothing industries have 
begun to decline in Hong Kong owing to tight labor supply. Many people think that it 
is imperative to engage in new industries reflecting Hong Kong's changing comparative 
advantage. High tech industry is a possible candidate. However, the development of 
this industry has not been very encouraging through the past twenty years. Our 
objective in this thesis is to offer a possible explanation for the failure of an economy 
to establish the high tech industry even when it is viable. i 
In this paper, we focus on the coordination failure involved in establishing the 
high tech industry. Two models are demonstrated. In Model 1, it is assumed that a 
sufficient amount of knowledge which is produced as a side product through capital 
investment is required in starting the high tech production. However, an individual 
capitalist is too small to supply enough capital to create the sufficient amount of 
knowledge needed. Hence coordination among different capitalists becomes very 
important in establishing the high tech industry. 
In Model 2，the high tech production requires specific physical capital as well 
as human capital. In addition, a sufficient amount of human capital is needed in the 
high tech production. These two kinds of capital do not exist at the beginning. It is 
i ln section 2.2, we discuss the failure of establishing the high tech production using the advanced 
technology rather Ihan the whole high lech industry. In addition, it is optimal for Ihe high lech 
industry to be established. 
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assumed that no single individual can provide both physical and human capital (not to 
mention sufficient amount of human capital) to start the production. Therefore it is 
necessary to coordinate the investment behavior of different capitalists. 
In these two models, when the high tech industry is viable, it may not be 
established because of coordination failure. Hence coordination policies are required 
to establish the high tech industry. Some policies like subsidizing higher education and 
investment in the specific physical capital will be discussed. Given the different 
underlying causes for coordination failure in the two models,, the corresponding 
coordination policies will also be different. Finally, we examine the implication of 
allowing capital mobility in the two models. It is shown that capital mobility can help 
resolve the coordination failure in some circumstances. 
Before proceeding to the description of the two models, we first take a brief 
look of the related literature. The concept of coordination failure is closely related to 
that of multiple equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria gives rise to the need to 
coordinate the behavior of different economic agents because some equilibria may be 
Pareto superior to others. Why does there exist multiple Pareto ranked equilibria? 
Cooper and John (1988) highlights the significance of spillovers and strategic 
complementaries in generating Pareto ranked multiple equilibria and therefore 
coordination failure. 
Among all possible equilibria, how is the final equilibrium determined? Broadly 
speaking, there are two mechanisms in choosing the final equilibrium. One is "history" ^ 
and another is "expectations". History sets initial condition which may determine the 
final equilibrium (Chada 1991, Krugman 1987). Krugman (1991) discusses the relative 
importance of these two factors. In a simple model, he demonstrates that it depends 
on the characteristics of the economy. The larger the cost of adjustment is, the more 
likely it is that history matters. However, initial condition plays no role in our models 
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as no adjustment cost is involved. Basically, our models stress the significance of 
"expectations" in determining the production pattern in an economy. 
The classic paper on the importance of "expectations", is by Rosenstein Rodan 
(1943). His "big push" or "balanced growth" theory contends that simultaneous 
industrialization of many sector can be self-sustaining whereas expansion of only one 
sector is not feasible. The reason is that there exist strategic complementaries created 
by demand linkages^ between economic agents in a multisector economy. The 
expansion of one sector cannot create enough demand that makes it profitable. But 
development of a wide range of sectors can generate sufficient demand for each other. 
Rosenstein Rodan's idea is modified and expounded by Scitovsky (1954) and 
Fleming (1955). Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) incorporate his idea into a 
mathematical model which has two equilibria. One is associated with industrialization 
and another without industrialization. The multiplicity of equilibria arises from 
aggregate demand spillovers among the firms which have access to increasing returns 
technology. Which equilibrium emerges depends on the investment decision (which 
determines the technology used) of these firms. When all these firms can coordinate 
their investments, the economy can move from the unindustrialized equilibrium to the 
one with industrialization. 
Discussion on the role of expectations in equilibrium selection also appears in 
the literature of macroeconomics. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) analyze the efficiency of 
investment in the presence of aggregate demand spillovers. The firms' profits are ^ 
positively related to aggregate income which rises with the profits of all firms in the 
economy. In other words, the firm generates pecuniary externality. In some 
situations, private optimal investment is not socially optimal under uncertainty. 
2Wc call it aggregate demand spillovers afterwards 
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Kiyotaki (1988) demonstrates that long term expectation of investors about 
future demand is a key factor in investment decisions. There exist two equilibria. One 
is associated with entrepreneur's optimistic expectation about the future demand and 
another with pessimistic expectation. The former Pareto dominates the latter . An 
investment subsidy can change the expectations from pessimistic to optimistic. 
Shieifer (1986) studies the timing of implementation of inventions in different 
sectors in the presence of aggregate demand spillovers. All inventions are 
implemented simultaneously since the associated profits are the highest. The duration 
between each implementation depends on the entrepreneur's expectations about the 
fliture path of macroeconomic variables. An economy may exhibit cyclical equlibria 
without any fluctuation in inventions. 
In our models, there is not any aggregate demand spillovers. The economy is 
assumed to be a small open economy. Domestic market size is not a constraint for 
production firms. The multiple equilibria originate from the thick market externality. 
It states that it is more attractive for any given economic agent to be economically 
active if many agents are economically active. 
In the classic model by Diamond (1982), multiple equilibria essentially arises 
from trading externality. The profitability of a production opportunity rises with the 
probability of finding a trader. If no trader is found, production project will not be 
undertaken. The more the potential trading partners, the easier is the trade. This in 
turn makes more production opportunities profitable. Hence the production level is � 
determined by the expected ease of trade. Optimistic expectation will result in an 
efficient production level. 
Rodrick (1993) demonstrates that some economies can have multiple 
production patterns. He assumes the high lech production requires a set of 
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differentiated intermediate inputs which must be produced locally. If no other 
intermediate inputs are expected to be produced, it may be unprofitable for a single 
firm to produce on its own. In other words, even when the high tech sector is viable, it 
may not be established. Coordination among different firms is decisive in equilibrium 
selection. Since the productivity of intermediate inputs rises with human capital of 
labor, middle-income economies with educated labor are likely to encounter 
coordination failure in the high tech sector. 
Our approach bears a close affinity to Rodrick's. But there are still two salient 
differences. First, he emphasizes the human capital embodied in labor as a key factor 
in determining the existence of coordination failure whereas our focus is on the labor 
capital endowment ratio. Second, the human capital is an exogenous variable in his 
model but an endogenous one in ours. Hence he does not discuss the role of education 
subsidy in facilitating the establishment of the high tech sector. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 and 3 describe two 
models in which coordination failure in the high tech industry is demonstrated. 
Chapter 4 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 Model 1 
In this chapter, we would discuss the first model of coordination failure in 
establishing the high tech industry. To start the high tech production, the economy 
needs to equip with a certain level of technical knowledge which can be generated 
from capital investment as a side product. However, no individual can provide a 
sufficient amount of capital which then yields enough knowledge to initiate the 
production. Therefore, coordination among different capital owners become essential. 
Otherwise, even when the high tech industry is viable, it may not be established. 
In the next section, a basic setup is used to demonstrate the coordination failure. 
In section 2.2，the model is then modified to cope with the actual production pattern. 
In section 2.3，four coordination policies will be discussed. Some common policies 
such as a subsidy on capital investment are shown to resolve coordination failure. The 
last section discusses how capital mobility can lead to the resolution of coordination 
failure in the high tech industry. 
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2.1 The Basic Model 
2.1.1 Specification of the Model 
Suppose an economy produces two tradable final goods X and Y with an 
exogenously given amount of unskilled labor (L) and physical capital (K). Physical 
capital K can be used in production only after it is transformed into specific physical 
capital Ky or K^. Assume that one unit of K can be transformed into either one unit of 
K^ or one unit of K , Good Y is the traditional manufacturing good which requires 
unskilled labor (L) and its specific physical capital (厂� w h i l e good X is the high tech 
good which is produced by its specific physical capital (K^) only. 
The production function of the traditional manufacturing industry is 
(1) Y = BLV/ 
and the production function of the high-tech industry is 
(2) X = A K ^ if where Z is a constant 
= 0 otherwise 
In (2), it is asserted that only when the aggregate capital stock K^ is larger than 
or equal to Z, the marginal product of each unit of K � i s A. Otherwise, the marginal 
product becomes zero. The justification of the specification of this production 
function is as follows. Z can be interpreted as a proxy for "knowledge threshold". We ^ 
assume that capital investment in the high tech industry can create knowledge which is 
very essential in production. It is also assumed that once discovered, knowledge 
becomes a public good to which any firm can access freely. Knowledge level is 
therefore determined by.the aggregate capital stock K^ in the high tech industry. To 
start the production of high tech good X，knowledge has to exceed a certain threshold 
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level and hence it is necessary to have a sufficient amount of aggregate capital stock 
K^ (>Z) to initiate the production of good X. When the aggregate capital stock is less 
than Z, no good X is produced but knowledge can be built up. 
Assume further that an individual capital owner is small enough so that its own 
contribution to aggregate capital stock K^ in the high tech industry can be neglected 
and therefore treats K^ as given. This assumption implies that there is no perfect 
capital market so that no individual capital owner can have a significant amount of 
specific physical capital stock K^ through borrowing. 
The economy is assumed to be a small open economy. It takes the international 
prices of goods X and Y as exogenously given. Suppose their respective international 
prices are q and 1. Free trade of final goods is allowed but factors are immobile. 
2.2 Analysis 
How a capital owner allocates his physical capital between K^ and Ky depends 
on their respective rental prices. The rental price of K^ is qA if the aggregate capital 
stock K^ is larger than or equal to Z.. The rental price of Ky is which 
reaches its lower bound, ( 1 - ，when all physical capital K is converted to 
Ky. 
the lower bound of the rental price of Ky is higher than 
the rental price of K乂. Therefore, capital owners will transform all physical capital K 
into Ky because of its higher price Thus the economy engages in the traditional 
manufacturing industry only. The high tech industry is not viable. The high tech 
industry is said to be viable when the transformed capital in the high tech industry, K太’ 
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has a higher value of marginal product or factor return than that in the traditional 
manufacturing industry K ” for some combination of K^ and Ky? 
l i { \ - p ) B L p K - f ^ ^ qA, there are two possible cases. Consider first the case 
( I ( L {\-p)B — > qA. {\-p)B and qA represent the rental prices of Ky \K-ZJ 
and K^ respectively when Z unit of physical capital is transformed into K^ and K-Z 
unit of physical capital transformed into Ky. If the amount of K^ transformed is less 
than Z, the rental price of K^ is zero but that of Ky is still positive.'* If the amount of 
K^ transformed is larger than or equal to Z, the rental price of K^ is constant at qA but 
f I that of Ky is bounded below by {\-P)B . Therefore, the rental price of Ky 
乂 K - Z) 
is certainly higher than that of K^ in any case. Thus all physical capital K will be 
transformed into Ky and only good Y is produced. In other words, the high tech 
industry is still not viable. 
( J 
If {\-p)B ~ - < qA, the high tech industry becomes viable. But under J 
this condition, there are two possible production pattern, one with the setup of the high 
tech industry and another without. If capital owners expect an enough amount of K^ 
(>Z) to be converted, their expected rental price of K^ is higher than that of Ky. for 
some combination of K^ and Ky. They will convert some physical capital K into K^ 
until their rental prices become equalized. The economy can therefore have a 
diversified production and the high tech industry will be established. The rental price 
and the value of marginal product of K^ and Ky are both qA which is also equal to 
can be shown that no reallocation of resources can increase the * 
value of total output. Hence we claim the production pattern is optimal in the sense 
that the allocation of resources (therefore the production pattern) is such that the value 
3Wc can define viability in another way. An industry is viable if it can be sustained without any 
government support in at least one equilibrium. 
4lt is due to the inada condition of the production function. 
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of total output is maximized. Note that if the high tech industry is viable, it is optimal 
for it to be established.^ 
A question is then raised. Will a decentralized economy necessarily achieve the 
optimal equilibrium? The answer is "no". Owing to the aggregate capital stock 
requirement in the high tech industry., the rental price of K^ hinges on whether a 
sufficient amount of K^ is devoted to the high tech industry. Since each individual 
capital owner has no influence on the aggregate capital stock, expected investment 
behavior of other owners becomes crucial in decision making of each capital owner. 
Suppose capital owners do not expect a sufficient amount of K:(乏 Z) to be 
transformed, Their rental prices of K^ is zero and therefore the best strategy is to 
invest in K , As a result, only good Y is produced. Despite the viability of the high 
tech industry, it fails to be established because investors cannot coordinate their 
investment decision. We call this coordination failure in establishing the high tech 
industry. This production is suboptimal since the viable high tech industry is not 
established. 
To sum up, there are two equilibria in a decentralized economy when the high 
tech industry is viable. One is associated with specialization in producing the 
traditional manufacturing good Y. Another one is characterized by the setup of the 
high tech industry. Nevertheless, which equilibrium will emerge depends on the 
investment behavior of all capital owners and hence coordination among them becomes 
very important. 
^In general, it is not iicccssary to have all viable industries established in an optimum. An example is 
given below. Suppose there arc two industries whose production function are identical and exhibit 
increasing returns. Both industries would be viable but either one should be active in the optimum. 
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2.3 The Modified Model 
2.3.1 Specification of the model 
The main conclusion in the previous section is that an economy may fail to 
establish the high tech industry when it is viable because of coordination failure. This 
conclusion sounds unsatisfactory in general. Suppose there are many countries in 
which the high tech industry is viable. It is possible that the most capital abundant 
country specializes in producing traditional manufacturing good if coordination failure 
remains unresolved whereas in the least capital abundant country, the high tech 
industry is established upon the resolution of coordination failure. This implication is 
inconsistent with the common observation in reality that most high tech goods are 
produced by capital abundant developed countries. To reconcile with the reality, this 
section presents a modified model. 
In the modified model, another production technology for the high tech good X 
is introduced. The production technology requires unskilled labor L as well as specific 
physical capital K太. T h e production function of the high tech industry using the 
second technology is 
(3) 
It is assumed y < p.(refer to equation (1)). This assumption is justified since the 
traditional manufacturing industry is more labor intensive compared with this high tech 
production technology. ^ 
This production technology can be interpreted as a backward technology for the 
production of the high tech good X. A key distinguishing feature in this production 
technology is the absence of the aggregate capital stock requirement in starting the 
production. As a result, specific physical capital K^ is productive regardless of its 
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aggregate amount. Knowledge created from capital investment is not required in this 
backward production method. Hence this industry can now be operated on a very 
small scale. 
For simplicity, we use HTG(l), HTG(2) and TMG to represent the high tech 
production using the first technology(refer to equation (2)), the high tech production 
using the second technology(refer to equation (3)) and the traditional manufacturing 
industry(refer to equation (1)) respectively. 
2.3.2 Analysis 
As before, the rental price is the determinant factor for investment behavior of 
capital owners. For HTG(l), the rental price of K^ is qA when the aggregate capital 
stock Kx is larger than or equal to Z. Otherwise, its rental price is zero. The 
determination of the rental prices for K^ and Ky in HTG(2) and TMG is more 
complicated. They depends on the labor capital endowment ratio associated with these 
two kinds of production. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of these two rental 
prices. In figure 1，the vertical axis represents the amount of unskilled labor L in an 
economy. The horizontal axis represents the endowment of physical capital K left 
available for these two kinds of production. Qy represents the isoquant which 
produces one dollars' worth of good Y. Since the international price of good Y is 
unity, the corresponding quantity for this isoquant is also unity. Qx2 shows the 
isoquant which produces one dollars' worth of good X. Since its price is q in the 
international market, the corresponding quantity for this isoquant is 1/q. If the labor 
capital endowment ratio associated with these two kinds of production lies between g, 食 
and g", then both goods, X and Y, are produced. The rental prices of K^ and Ky are 
both represented by the inverse of the horizontal intercept of the isocost line I. If the 
associated labor capital endowment ratio exceeds g•’ the isocost line becomes I,. Then 
only good Y is produced and the rental price of K^ increases relative to the former 
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case. In short, the associated labor capital endowment ratio determines the rental 
prices of K^ and Ky for these two kinds of production. 
Now attention will be focused on the production pattern under different labor 
capital endowment ratios. We will examine whether multiple production patterns 
exist. There are four cases to be discussed. In each case, the production technologies 
for each industry is held constant. 
Case 1 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio (gl in figure 2) 
exceeding g丨.Without considering HTG(l), all physical capital K will be transformed 
into Ky and only good Y is produced. In figure 2. The rental price of Ky is r ' which 
is equal to ( I - . If > qA, HTG(l) is not viable. The economy 
specializes in producing good Y. If /'' < qA, there are two possible cases. If f 
{\-p)B —~- > qA, all physical capital K will be transformed into K owing to a 
higher rental price. In other words, HTG(l) remains not viable. HTG(l) becomes 
( I viable if {\-p)B — < qA. Under this circumstance, there exist two possible 
production patterns. The first one is diversified production of both goods X and Y. 
Suppose capital owners expect a sufficient amount of K^ (>Z) to be transformed, they 
will transform some physical capital K into K^ and use it in HTG(l) owing to a higher 
rental price. Then the labor capital endowment ratio associated with TMG and 
HTG(2) rises. In figure 2, the equilibrium is located at E where rental prices of K太. 
and Ky are both equal to qA. Then the economy engages in both TMG and HTG(l). 
Since the viable HTG(l) is established and the value of marginal product of K丈.and 
Ky are equalized, this equilibrium is also optimal. Here optimality requires the 
establishment of HTG(l) rather than the whole high tech industry(including HTG(l) 
and HTG(2)) . 
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However, there is another production pattern in a decentralized economy. 
Suppose an insufficient amount of K^ is expected to be transformed, no individual has 
an incentive to invest in K^ on his own even though HTG(l) is viable. Thus the 
economy only specializes in producing good Y. Coordination failure exists since 
HTG(l) can not be established even though it is viable. Refer to figure 2，coordination 
failure may exist in the economies where labor capital endowment ratio lies between g* 
( I 
and g' where g* is the labor capital endowment ratio such that {\-p)B = 
I 火一 Z 乂 
qA.6 For the economies whose labor capital endowment ratio exceeds g*, the high 
tech industry is basically not viable. For simplicity, we assumed g* >g'. This 
assumption implies that HTG(l) is viable whenever HTG(2) is viable.? 
Case 2 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio (g2 in figure 3) lies 
between g' and g** where g** is the labor capital endowment ratio such that Z unit of 
K^ is devoted to HTG(2) when only considering TMG and HTG(2). From figure 3, 
the economy engages in both HTG(2) and TMG without considering HTG(l) . The 
/ ^ Y 
rental prices of K^ and Ky are both r. Since g* > g', r < qA and {\-p)B > 
\K-Z 
qA for labor capital endowment ratio in this range. Therefore, HTG(l) is viable. 
Similarly, there are two possible production patterns under this condition. If a 
sufficient amount of K^ (^Z) is expected to be transformed, capital owners will 
transform some physical capital K into K^ owing to a higher rental price. Thus the 
labor capital endowment ratio associated with HTG(2) and TMG increases. The 
equilibrium is located at E where rental prices of K^ and Ky are qA. The economy 
engages in both TMG and HTG(l) but not HTG(2). No investor is willing to devote 
K^ to HTG(2) because K^ yields a higher return in HTG(l) . The rental price of K^ in 
^The value of g* depends on the size of L and K. The larger K is, the larger is g*. Similar argument 
is held for g**, h* and h**.(define later) 
^In order to rcach the conclusion, we need to rule out the possibility lhal g* > g " . ll can be satisfied 
if HTG(2) is not very productive, HTG(l) is not very unproductive or Z is very large. 
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HTG(l) is qA which is higher than r in HTG(2) since g* > g,. This production pattern 
is optimal since the viable HTG(l) is established and the value of marginal product of 
K^ and Ky are equalized. Nevertheless, the economy can get stuck in another 
suboptimal production pattern. Without HTG(l), the capital owners may have an 
incentive to invest in K^ individually and use it in HTG(2). However, the aggregate 
capital stock still falls short of Z. Unless the investment decision of different capital 
owners cannot be coordinated so that at least Z unit of K^ is transformed, they will 
instead invest in Ky. The economy will then engage in TMG and HTG(2) and the 
rental price of K^ and Ky are both r (<qA). This production pattern is suboptimal 
since no K^ is transformed and used in HTG(l) though HTG(l) is viable. 
Coordination failure exists but at a lesser extent. A fewer owners' investment behavior 
needed to be coordinated since there have already existed some K^ without HTG(l). 
As the labor capital endowment ratio is a bit lower than the former case, coordination 
failure becomes less serious. To sum up, coordination failure may exist in the 
economies whose labor capital endowment ratios lies between g' and g**. 
Case 3 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio (g3 in figure 4)lies 
between g** and g" where g" is the labor capital endowment ratio such that the 
economy only engages in HTG(2)when only TMG and HTG(2) are considered. From 
figure 4，the economy engages in both HTG(2) and TMG without considering HTG(l) 
and the rental price of K^ and Ky are both r. HTG(l) is viable since g* > g. In 
contrast to earlier cases, the economy has an unique production pattern. Even without 
HTG(l), a sufficient amount of K^ (^Z) is transformed from physical capital K and 
then devoted to HTG(2). This change is due to the availability of HTG(2) and the low 
labor capital endowment ratio. Under such circumstances, it is certain that sufficient 
knowledge is generated from K父.H T G ( l ) can therefore be started. Coordination 
failure ceases to exist. More capital owners will then transform their physical capital K 
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into K^ for HTG(l) because of its higher rental price.^ The labor capital endowment 
ratio associated with HTG(2) and TMG rises. At equilibrium, the economy operates at 
E where the rental prices of K^ and K^ are both qA and both HTG(l) and TMG are 
established. For the same reason in case 2, HTG(2) is not established. This 
production pattern is also optimal. In short, those economies with the labor capital 
endowment ratio lying between g** and g" become free of coordination failure. 
Case 4 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio(g4 in figure 5) is less 
than g". Without HTG(l), only HTG(2) is established and the rental price of K^ is r \ 
Since qA > r and g* > g•，HTG(l) is viable. Similar to case 3, coordination failure 
does not exist. This is due to an enough amount of K^ being transformed even without 
HTG(l). The economy engages in both HTG(l) and TMG but not HTG(2) at 
equilibrium. The absence of HTG(2) is due to the higher return of K^ in HTG(l) . The 
rental prices of and Ky are both qA and therefore the production pattern is optimal. 
To sum up, coordination failure no longer exists for the economies with the labor 
capital endowment ratios less than g丨丨. 
From the above discussion, only the economies with the labor capital endowment 
ratios ranging from g* and g** may encounter coordination failure in HTG(l). For 
those economies with very high labor capital endowment ratios, HTG(l) is basically 
not viable. Hence it is unnecessary to be concerned about the coordination failure. In 
reality, less developed countries belong to this group. They usually do not produce the 
high tech goods. ^ 
For those economies with low labor capital endowment ratios, coordination 
failure does not exist although HTG(l) is viable. Owing to low labor capital 
^At equilibrium, all K太 IransformccI will be used in HTG(l) only. 
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endowment ratios, capital owners have greater incentive to invest in K^ which then 
creates sufficient knowledge to initiate HTG(l). Highly developed countries are in this 
category. This result is consistent with the fact that these countries produce most high 
tech good. 
For those with moderate labor capital endowment ratios which lie between g* 
and g", HTG(l) should be established owing to international specialization. However, 
coordination failure exists. Without coordination policy, it is hard to tell whether 
HTG(l) can be established. Middle developed economies like Hong Kong and Taiwan 
belong to this class. 
2.2.3 Discussion 
In the above analysis, production technology is held constant. In reality, 
production technology in each industry varies across different countries. As is well 
known, the productivity level in the high tech industry, especially HTG⑴，is lower in 
less or middle developed countries. However, the main conclusion does not change 
even when we consider the difference of productivity level of the high tech industry in 
different countries. Now suppose the economy with low labor capital endowment 
ratio has a high value of parameters A and C. Let the economy with the labor capital 
endowment ratio g’ be a reference point. For those economies with ratios lower than 
g•，the values of A and C are higher compared with those values in the former analysis. 
For those economies with ratios greater than g'，the values of A and C is lower. Then 
for less developed countries where HTG(l) is originally not viable, HTG(l) is still not 
viable as its productivity is lower. For highly developed countries where no ^ 
coordination failure exists, capital owners have greater incentive to invest in K^ than 
before since the productivity of HTG(2) improves. Hence the developed countries still 
experience no coordination failure. Some middle developed countries may become 
free of coordination failure or have no viable HTG(l) upon this change But there still 
exist some middle developed countries which may fail to establish HTG(l) when it is 
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viable. For sake of elaboration, we continue to hold the production technology 
constant in the following analysis. On the other hand, the technology for TMG is 
mature enough so that its difference across different countries can be neglected. 
Since the technology in the high tech industry is immature, there is still some room 
for productivity improvement. Suppose there is a productivity improvement in HTG(l). 
This leads to an increase in g*.(recall the definition of g*). Thus the most capital 
abundant less developed countries may be induced to encounter coordination failure. 
The class of economies which may face coordination failure expands. 
If the productivity improvement occurs for HTG(2), then the implication is totally 
different. Now g** will rise. It implies that the most capital abundant middle developed 
countries become free of coordination failure. The band of economies which may have 
coordination failure diminishes.. 
Suppose the price of high tech good, q, rises. We find that both g* and g** 
increase. This implies that the most capital abundant less developed countries may be 
induced to encounter coordination failure whereas the most capital abundant middle 
developed countries become free of coordination failure. In other words, the class of 
economies which may experience coordination failure shifts from middle developed 
countries towards less developed countries. This result has a strong implication on 
protection policy in less developed countries. Suppose these countries impose an import 
tariff on the high tech good. Then its domestic price rises. Unless the increase is 
substantial, the high tech industry may not be established for two reasons. First, the high ^ 
tech industry is still not viable in spite of the tariff. Second, even though it is viable, the 
economies may encounter coordination failure. In sum, protection policy is not as 
effective as is expected in fostering the setup of high tech industry in less developed 
countries. 
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2.3 Coordination Policy 
This section describes four coordination policies that can resolve the 
coordination failure and therefore foster the setup of the high tech industry. We will 
focus on an economy which experiences coordination failure(therefore having 
suboptimal production pattern). The first three policies aim at raising the return for the 
investment in K太.Thus capital owners are induced to transform more physical capital 
K into K^ so that at least Z unit of K^ is transformed. As a result, coordination failure 
ceases to exist since HTG(l) is certainly to be established. The last one helps to 
establish the high tech industry by eliminating the distortion in capital market. 
2.3.1 Production subsidy 
Suppose government grant a subsidy to the high tech production(HTG(l) and 
HTG(2)). The quantity that generates one dollar's worth of good X becomes less. 
Qx2 will then shift inward (refer to figure 1)9 The rental price of K^ in HTG(2) 
increases. Therefore capital owners have greater incentive to invest in K^ without 
HTG(l). If the subsidy is high enough that a sufficient amount of K^ is transformed 
and enough knowledge is created. Thus HTG(l) gets started and coordination failure 
no longer exists. However, welfare improvement through a production subsidy is not 
guaranteed ^^since it brings over-investment in K^ and then over-production of 
HTG(l).ii 
2.3.2 Investment Subsidy 
A subsidy to the investment in specific physical capital K^ encourages capital 
owners to invest in K乂. If the subsidy is large enough, there will be a sufficient amount 
9 a production subsidy also raises g*. However, this change has no real cffccl on the economy. 
lOlf this policy is adopted in the less developed or developed countries, it can never be welfare 
enhancing since the original production pattern is optimal. 
l i l t is because the return for investment in K^ is greater than qA, Ihc value of its marginal product in 
social oplimum. 
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of aggregate capital stock. Coordination failure ceases to exist and HTG(l) can 
therefore be established. Since there exists over-investment in K^ and overproduction 
of good X，we cannot ensure that an investment subsidy is a welfare enhancing policy 
2.3.3 Trade Policy 
Another approach which can accomplish the same task is a trade policy. An 
import tariff on the high tech good can produce the same effect as its domestic price 
and therefore the rental price of K^ will rise. Trade policy differs from the above two 
policies for it introduces an additional distortionary effect on consumption side which 
is undesirable. 
2.3.4 Eliminating distortion in capital market 
Coordination failure is mainly due to the inability of an individual capital owner 
collecting a sufficient amount of physical capital through capital market. Suppose 
government acts as an intermediary between different capital owners. It channels 
physical capital from some capital owners to those who want to have a sufficient 
amount of physical capital to start the high tech production on their own. 
Coordination failure is resolved. In fact, the method is better than the above three 
since the distortion in capital market is attacked head on and no new distortion are 
created.. 
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2.4 Capital Mobility 
It is noted that free trade will lead to equalization of factor returns provided that 
the economies diversify their production. If some economies specialize in producing 
one good, it is possible that the factor returns vary across the economies. However, if 
factor mobility is allowed, factor returns will equalize again because the factors will 
move to those economies where their returns are the highest. 12 This section examines 
the implication of factor mobility in our model. 
Assume only specific physical capital K^ and Ky are mobile across different 
economies'^ while unskilled labor still remains immobile. In general, capital is more 
mobile than unskilled labor. Unskilled labors have to adjust themselves to a new 
working environment. Language problem and different social customs are also 
common problems that limit the mobility of labor. Hence this assumption seems 
reasonable in reality. 
Consider two economies A and B which differ only in their labor capital 
endowment ratios. Economy A has a ratio between g* and g**. Without coordination 
policy, it may get stuck in suboptimal equilibrium where only TMG is established and 
the rental price of K^ is less than qA. Economy B is more capital abundant. Its ratio 
is less than g**. HTG(l) is viable and also established owing to the absence of 
coordination failure. The rental prices of K^ and K^ are both equal to qA. 
Suppose capital is allowed to move between these two economies. Then the ^ 
investment behavior of capital owners in economy A inevitably changes since they 
know that K^ can also be used in HTG(l) in economy B. Since HTG(l) is certain to 
be established in economy B, they are inclined to invest in K^. Even there is an 
i2For details, see Mundell(1957) 
I3lt makes no difference if physical capital K is assumed to be mobile. 
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insufficient amount of K^ transformed in economy A, the capital owner can still earn 
qA by transferring K^ to HTG(l) in economy B. Under such circumstances, it is 
possible that a sufficient amount of K^ is transformed and HTG(l) get started in 
economy A. No actual movement of K^ between two economies may be observed. 
However, it is also possible that capital owners move their K^ to HTG(l) in economy 
B while economy A continues to engage in TMG only. In any case, the rental prices of 
K^ and Ky become qA in both economies. The national income in economy A rises 
under capital mobility. 
This theoretical demonstration does not necessarily mean perfect capital mobility 
is socially desirable. In reality, developed countries usually have a more productive 
HTG(l) so that the rental price of K^ is higher in these countries. Allowing capital 
mobility only leads to capital outflow in middle developed countries. Although the 
rental price of K^ is higher in developed countries, the setup of HTG(l) in less or 
middle developed countries are socially beneficial if there exist significant technological 
spillovers among different high tech industries” This may partly explains why some 
countries, especially less or middle developed countries, still restrict the capital 
movement. 
i4Assume capital owner does not move with capital but repatriate earnings back to iheir home. 
" In our model, there docs not exist any technological spillovers among different high tech industries 
since only one type of high Icch industry is assumed 
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CHAPTER 3 Model 2 
This chapter presents the second model of coordination failure where high tech 
production requires specific physical capital as well as human capital, and a certain 
level of human capital is needed to start the production. Since it is unlikely for any 
individual to invest in both physical and human capital at the same time, coordination 
failure arises between different groups of investors. Under such circumstances, it 
becomes essential to coordinate investment behavior of different capitalists. 
Otherwise, coordination failure prevents the high tech industry from establishing in the 
economy. 
The main difference from Model 1 is that human capital is an essential factor 
input in the high tech industry in model 2. This formulation serves two purposes. 
First, it captures the notion of the importance of human capital in the high tech 
industry. Second, it allows us to discuss the policies such as subsidizing education and 
providing free higher education on the ground of resolving coordination failure. 
The first half of this chapter focus on demonstrating the coordination failure and 
then modifying the model to make it consistent with the actual production pattern. In 
section 3.3，coordination policy will be discussed. In the last section, we turn to 
discuss the implication of allowing capital mobility. 
{ 
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3.1 The Basic Model 
3.1.1 Specification of the model 
Suppose an economy produces two tradable final goods X and Y with both 
unskilled labor (L) and physical capital (K). Physical capital K can be used in 
production only after it is transformed into specific physical capital K^ or Ky or human 
capital H on one for one basis. i6 Good Y is the traditional manufacturing good which 
requires unskilled labor (L) and specific physical capital {Ky) while good X is the high 
tech good which is produced by human capital (H) 口 and its specific physical capital 
The production function of the traditional manufacturing good is 
(4) Y = BlfKl-P 
and the production function of the high tech good is 
(5) X = AH^Kl ' " i fH > W where W is a constant 
= 0 otherwise 
In (4)，it is asserted that when the amount of human capital H is less than W in a 
production firm, the factor inputs become unproductive. This formulation of 
production function captures the idea that there is a minimum requirement of human 
capital in the production of high tech good X. This assumption is reasonable in the 
sense that a high tech production usually requires a group of professionals or scientists. 
'^Human capital is produced by physical capital only in this model. Usually, time and labor input are 
involved. See Findlay and Kierz.kowski(l983). Since our model is implicitly a one period model 
which has no time dimension, lime input is neglcclcd. In addition, in order to keep the algebra 
simple, we choose lo simplify Ihc production function of human capital by ncglecling labor input. 
i^Unskilled labor refers lo simple skill thai arc available for a healthy physical body. It can be 
measured by counts of people. On the other hand, human capital is the measure of cumulative effect 
of education. This distinction has been used in Romer(1990). 
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Another key feature in this model is that an individual capital owner cannot invest 
in both human capital H and specific physical capital {K^ or K^). This assumption is 
very important in reaching our conclusion. In reality, a student usually does not invest 
in any specific machinery or apparatus. It is also unlikely for a capitalist (assume he is 
also a firm owner) to pay for training a specialist, especially when the skill acquired is 
not firm specific. 
The economy is assumed to be a small open economy. It takes the international 
prices of goods X and Y as exogenously given. Suppose their rental prices are q and 1 
respectively. It is further assumed that free trade of final goods is allowed but factor 
inputs are immobile across different economies. 
3.1.2 Analysis 
According to the rental prices of different capital, capital owners make their 
investment decision. The rental price of K^ is { [ - / ^ B l f l C / . It has a lower bound, 
which is reached when all physical capital K is converted to K^. The 
rental prices of K^ and H are {\- a)qAH ‘‘K；" and respectively when 
the amount of human capital H is larger than or equal to W in a firm producing the 
high tech good X. At equilibrium, their rental prices must be equalized since they are 
both transformed from physical capital K on one for one basis. It is easily deduced that 
the equilibrium rental prices of both capital K^ and H are equal to 
/ \ a 
{\-a)qA — .18 
U - a y 
i8The rental prices of human capital H and specific physical capital K叉 are the same. Then 
( a / l - a ) = (////：」 
At equilibrium, the ratio of human c叩kal H and specific physical capital K丈 is ( a / l - a ) . 
Therefore the rental prices of both capital arc {\-a)qA{a/\-af 
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f a y Consider if > (1 - a)qA ，all physical capital K will be U - a y 
transformed into K^ owing to a higher rental price. The high tech industry is not 
viable and only good Y is produced. 
广 a 丫 
On the contrary, if < (1— a)qA\ ，there are two possible 
L f a y cases. Consider first the case {\-p)B — > (1 - d)qA . 
V a) / Y 
L ( a X {\-p)B — and {\- a)qA represent the rental prices of transformed 
K-— \\-cc) 
V a y 
capital in the manufacturing industry and the high tech industry when W unit of human 
capital H and W( l - a ) / a unit of specific physical capital K^^ xs employed in the high tech 
industry. If the amount of human capital H devoted to the high tech industry is less 
than W, the rental prices of transformed capital in the high tech industry is zero 
whereas that in the manufacturing industry is positive. If the amount of human capital 
H is larger than or equal to W, the rental prices of transformed capital in the high tech 
/ \a 
• . ( CC \ industry is constant at (1 - a)qA while that in the traditional manufacturing 
U - a y 
/ y 
industry is bounded below by {\-p)B ^ ^ . Therefore the rental price of 
K - -\ a y 
transformed capital in the traditional manufacturing industry is higher than those in the 
high tech industry in any case. All physical capital K will be transformed into Ky and 
used in the traditional manufacturing industry. The high tech industry is not viable. 气 
2 6 
f y 
The high tech industry becomes viable if { \ - p ) B ~ ^ ^ < 
K - -
V a 7 ( a \ « (1 - a)qA . But it may still not be established without government 
intervention. If K^ and a sufficient amount of H is expected to be converted, some 
capital owners transform their physical capital K into K^ or H until the rental prices of 
all transformed capital become equalized. Therefore, the economy will engage in both 
high tech industry and traditional manufacturing industry. Both goods X and Y are 
produced. This production pattern is also optimal. However, a decentralized economy 
does not necessarily achieve this optimum. If there does not exist K^ and a sufficient 
amount of H transformed, the rental prices of K^ and H are zero. Since an individual 
capital owner cannot own both K^ and H, the return for their investment in K^ or H 
depends on the investment behavior of other capital owners. Suppose K^ and a 
sufficient amount of H is not expected to be transformed. All capital owner will 
choose to invest in Ky. We call this coordination failure among different investors. 
Under this circumstance, only good Y is produced although it is optimal for high tech 
industry to be established. 
In sum, there are two equilibria for a decentralized economy when the high tech 
industry is viable. One is characterized by specialization of good Y owing to the 
coordination failure. Another one is associated with diversified production of goods X 
and Y. The second equilibrium generates a higher value of total output than the first 
one. Since the investment decision of all capital owners determine the final 
equilibrium, coordination among different capital owners becomes very essential. 有 
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3.2 The Modified Model 
3.2.1 Specification of the model 
The basic setup in the previous section has a very serious drawback. Whenever 
the high tech industry is viable, the economy may experience coordination failure in 
establishing the high tech industry This conclusion seems a little bit inconsistent with 
the production pattern in reality. In this section, an attempt will be drawn on 
modifying the basic setup in this aspect. 
In the modified model, another production technology for the traditional 
manufacturing good Y is introduced. It requires human capital H and its specific 
physical capital K^. Explicitly, the production function of the traditional 
manufacturing industry using this second technology is 
(6) Y = C H ' K l - ' 
Human capital H is substituted for unskilled labor L in this production method. 
Now human capital H can be employed in production of both goods X and Y. As a 
result, human capital H is productive no matter whether K^ and a sufficient amount of 
H is transformed. In reality, an engineer can work in an assembly line as an unskilled 
labor although he does not have any comparative advantage in performing this task. 
For simplicity, we employ HTG, TMG(l) and TMG(2) to denote the high tech 
industry(refer to equation(5)), the traditional manufacturing industry using the first 
technology (refer to equation(4))and that using the second technology(refer to 气 
equation(6)) respectively. 
3.2.2 Analysis 
As before, the rental prices of different capital determine the investment decision 
of capital owners. For HTG, the rental prices of K^ and H are still equal to 
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( a X . (1 - a)qA if the amount of human capital H is larger than or equal to W in a v i - a y 
high tech firm. For TMG(l), the rental price of K^ is { } - P ) B l f K - / . For TMG(2), 
/ V 
the rental prices of K^ and H are (1 —力C — ^ .i9 It is assumed that 
U - r ; 
( a Y f y Y (1 - a ) q A > {\-y)C . This assumption implies human capital H U - a 乂 U - r ； 
generates a higher factor return in HTG than in TMG(2). In reality, a high tech firm 
usually offer a higher pay for a scientist than a clothing factory. 
Now we would focus on whether there exist multiple production patterns and 
associated coordination failure under different labor capital endowment ratio. There 
are three cases to be discussed. In each case, the production technology for each 
industry is held constant. 
Case 1 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio exceeds h' where h, is 
f a X the labor capital endowment ratio such that = (1 - d)qA . HTG 
and TMG(2) are not viable under this condition. All capital owners transform their 
physical capital K into K^ owing to a higher rental price. Therefore, the economy 
engages in TMG(l ) only. It is unnecessary to be concerned about the coordination 
failure in establishing HTG. 
\ 
19 The rental price of human capital H is y C { U I and that for specific physical capital K^ is 
( 1 - / ) C ( / / / K y Y . Since they arc both iransformcd from K on one for one basis, they should be the 
same at equilibrium. Then it implies 
(厂/i-r) = (///火少） 
At equilibrium, ihe ratio of huiiian capital H and specific physical capital is ( j / l - f ) . Then rental 
prices of both capital are equal lo r)C{yl \-yf 
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Case 2 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio lies between h, and h" 
where h" is the labor capital endowment ratio such that = 
f \r y 
. For this economy, there are two possible cases. If 
U - r； / \P 
L / ^ \ a 
{\-p)B — > (1 - a)qA ，all capital owners transform their physical 
V a ) 
capital K into Ky because its rental price is higher than others'. HTG remains not 
/ \P 
I ( a X viable. If {\-P)B ———< {\-a)qA ——,HTG becomes viable. But there 
K-— U-aJ 
V a y 
exist two possible production patterns for the economy. If K^ and a sufficient amount 
of H is expected to be converted, capital owners will transform some physical capital K 
into K^ and H. The economy then engages in both HTG and TMG(l) and the rental 
/ \a 
prices of K乂, K^ or H are all equal to (1 - a)qA . This production pattern is 
U - a y 
optimal. 
However, a decentralized economy needs not achieve this optimum. If K^ and a 
sufficient amount of H is not expected to be transformed, an individual owner will not 
invest in K^ or H on his own. Instead, he will convert physical capital K into Ky and 
use it in TMG(l). Thus only TMG(l) is established. The economy gets stuck in a 
suboptimal production pattern. Coordination failure exists since specific physical 
capital K- and human capital H is not transformed and used in HTG despite its \ 
viability. In sum, coordination failure may exist for the economies whose labor capital 
endowment ratio lies between h* and h" where h* is the ratio such that 
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I ( a X {\-p)B — = (1 - a)qA For the economies whose labor capital 
K-— V l - a y 
V a ) 
endowment ratio exceeds h*, HTG is not viable. We assume h* > h" for simplicity. 
This implies HTG is viable whenever TMG(2) is viable. 
Case 3 
Consider an economy whose labor capital endowment ratio is less than h". Since 
h* is assumed to be greater than h"，HTG(l) is viable. In this situation, it is optimal to 
transfer some physical capital K out of TMG(l) into HTG. The economy should 
engage in both TMG(l) and HTG but not TMG(2) since transformed capital can 
always yield a higher value of marginal product in HTG than in TMG(2). 
However, does a decentralized economy attain this optimum? In other words, 
will the economy experience coordination failure? 
Suppose we neglect HTG. The economy will then engage in TMG(l) and 
/ \r 
TMG(2) and the rental prices of K^ and H are both equal to (1 - Y)C — ^ . There 
is no coordination failure involved in establishing TMG(2) although Ky and H do not 
exist in the economy at the beginning. K^ is always transformed since TMG(l) is 
always operated, Otherwise, unskilled labor cannot be fully employed. Owing to a 
higher rental price, some physical capital will be transformed into H since K^ is certain 
to be transformed in the economy. Hence TMG(2) does not involve any coordination 
failure. ^ 
Even without considering HTG, some capital owners are willing to invest in H. 
Whether coordination failure gets resolved depends on the amount of human capital H 
devoted to TMG(2) without considering HTG. There are two possibilities. If the 
3 1 
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labor capital endowment ratio is not low enough so that {\-p)B ~ ^ ^ 20〉 
K- — 
V Y ) 
f Y 
(1 - y)C — ^， t h e amount of human capital transformed for TMG(2) will be less 
y^-rj， 
than W, the human capital requirement in HTG. Unless the investment decision of 
different capital owners can be coordinated so that at least W unit of human capital H 
is transformed, no capital owner will invest in K^. Coordination failure still exists. 
Without any coordination policy, the economy will engage in TMG(l ) and TMG(2) 
and therefore only good Y is produced. Needless to say, this production pattern is not 
optimal. 
/ Y 
r ( y 
L y If {\-p)B ^ < {\-y)C — ~ ， t h e coordination failure no longer 
K - - U-r； I R) 
exists. Even without HTG, a sufficient amount of human capital H (> W) will be 
transformed by capital owners. Provided that a sufficient amount of human capital H 
exists, some capital owners will turn to invest in K^ instead of Ky because of a higher 
rental price of K工 in HTG. All human capital H will be used in HTG instead of 
TMG(2) owing to a higher rental price. Thus HTG gets started. The economy 
engages in both HTG and TMG(l) and the rental prices of K太’ K^ and H are all equal 
f a X . . . to {l-a)qA . This equilibrium is also optimal. In sum, the economies with 
\ \ - A J 
the labor capital endowment ratio less than h** becomes free of coordination failure 
/ 
( V L y where h** is the labor capital ratio such that ^ = (1 —rtC . < 
K - - v l - r ； I Y ) 
20lt represents the rental price of Ky in TMG(l ) when W unit of human capital H and W(l-Y)/y unit 
of specific physical capital Ky arc devoted to TMG(2). 
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For those economies whose labor capital endowment ratio falls between h" and h**, 
coordination failure still exist. 
From the above discussion, only the economies with moderate labor capital 
endowment ratios between h* and h** may encounter coordination failure in HTG. 
For those economies with very high labor capital endowment ratios, HTG is basically 
not viable. Therefore, they need not worry about coordination failure in HTG. In 
reality, less developed countries belong to this group. They usually do not have any 
comparative advantage over the high tech good X. 
For those economies with very low labor capital endowment ratios, coordination 
failure ceases to exist when HTG is viable. Owing to low labor capital endowment 
ratios, it is certain that a sufficient amount of human capital H is transformed by capital 
owners. This leads to the establishment of HTG by stimulating further investment in 
K^ and H. Highly developed countries are in this category. 
For those countries with moderate labor capital endowment ratios, it is optimal 
for HTG to be established owing to their comparative advantage. However, there 
exists coordination failure in this industry. Without any coordination policy, whether 
HTG can be established remains uncertain. Middle developed countries belong to this 
class. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
We turn to the impact of productivity improvement in HTG. Consider there is an 戈 
increase in A. It can be deduced that h* increases. HTG becomes viable in the most 
capital abundant less developed countries. However, h** is not affected by any change 
in A. This implies that productivity improvement only induces more economies to 
experience coordination failure. Similarly, a rise in the price of high tech good, q, 
produces the same effect. This result has a very strong implication on protection 
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policy on high tech good in less developed countries. Suppose these countries levies 
an import tariff on the high tech good and then its domestic price rises. The high tech 
industry is still not established because of two factors. First, the high tech industry is 
still not viable even though an import tariff is imposed. Second, it may be due to 




3.3 Coordination Policy 
This section will examine two coordination policies which can resolve the 
coordination failure and then foster the setup of HTG. As in the section 2.3, we focus 
on an economy where coordination failure exists in establishing HTG. The 
coordination policies will concentrate on the investment in human capital. The 
principle is to ensure a sufficient amount of human capital H to be transformed in the 
economy. 
3.3.1 Free Provision of Education 
Suppose the government provides public higher education for their citizens. If 
the specialists and professionals trained provide a sufficient amount of human capital, 
W, other capital owners are induced to invest in K^ since the return is higher. Further 
private investment in human capital H follows. A virtuous cycle begins and eventually 
HTG can be established. 
In reality, many countries provide public education to their citizens. However, 
free education is usually confined to the basic education. Higher education is at most 
heavily subsidized. Now we turn to examine the impact of subsidizing the higher 
education in the aspect of resolving the coordination failure. 
3.3.2 Subsidizing Human Capital Investment 
Suppose government imposes a subsidy on the investment in human capital. The 
subsidy rate is s. Then the return for investment in human capital in TMG(2) increase 
to {\-r)C{{\^-s)yl\-yy. If it is high enough so that a sufficient amount of human 
capital，W, IS invested in this industry, then it will stimulate the investment in specific 
physical capital K^ and promote the setup of HTG. Coordination failure no longer 
exists. The impact of subsidy is to increase the return for investment in human capital 
H in TMG(2). It in turn provides an impetus for the establishment of HTG since a 
sufficient amount of human capital H is certain to be transformed. 
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Despite the setup of HTG, the subsidy also leads to over-investment in human 
capital and then over-production of high tech good X. Therefore the final equilibrium 
cannot be considered optimal. In sum, it is difficult to tell whether the economic 
welfare can be improved through coordination policy. 
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3.4 Capital Mobility 
In this section, the implication of capital mobility will be discussed. An example 
will be used to illustrate how capital mobility can resolve the coordination failure in an 
economy. Yet only transformed capital such as K ” Ky and H is allowed to move 
across different economies while unskilled labor remains immobile. In general, this 
assumption is reasonable. Now we consider two economies C and D which differ only 
in their labor capital endowment ratios. The ratio in economy C lies between h* and 
h**. Then HTG is viable but may not be established because of coordination failure. 
Economy D has a ratio less than h**. Coordination failure ceases to exist and then 
HTG is established. In other words, economy D will engage in TMG(l) and HTG. 
Suppose specific physical capital K” K^ and human capital H is allowed to move 
across different economies. Consider there is an individual capital owner in economy 
C who would like to invest in K文.Without capital mobility, he will not do on his own 
even though HTG is viable unless a sufficient amount of human capital H (> W) is 
expected to be transformed. Now, his decision changes since K^ transformed can also 
be used in HTG in economy D. Since HTG is certain to be established in economy D, 
I CC \ the rental price of K^ is surely (1 - a)qA no matter whether there exists a 
U - a y 
sufficient amount of human capital H in economy C. This change alters the investment 
behavior of capital owners. The similar argument applies to the capital owner who 
would like to invest in H. Basically, there are two possible consequences. It is 
possible that K^ and a sufficient amount of H exist and then HTG is established in 
economy C. Coordination failure vanishes. However, it is also possible that K^ and H { 
transformed in economy C will move to economy D and is used in HTG here. In this 
case，HTG expands in economy B but economy C still does not engage in HTG. 
( \ a 
Nevertheless, the rental price of K” K^ and H are all equal to {\-a)qA in 
• U - a y 
both cases. 
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As mentioned in the section 2.4, this kind of demonstration has its own 
limitation. The underlying assumptions about two economies need not reflect the 
reality. Hence it is very dangerous to use the above example as an argument to 
support capital mobility around the world. 
3 8 
CHAPTER 4 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we present two models in which coordination failure in the high 
tech industry are demonstrated. In these two models, the productivity of capital used 
in the high tech industry depends on the collective investment decision of capital 
owners. Unless capital owners coordinate their investment, the high tech industry 
cannot be established despite its viability. It is shown that the economies with 
moderate labor capital endowment ratio are likely to experience coordination failure in 
establishing the high tech industry. Capital abundant countries can establish the high 
tech industry without coordination policy whereas in labor abundant countries, only 
traditional manufacturing industry is viable. 
Coordination policy can help resolve the coordination failure. However, since 
they sometimes introduce some distortion in the market, the economic welfare need 
not be improved. Under some circumstances, capital mobility can lead to the 
resolution of coordination failure. But this result is not directly equivalent to any 
policy implication. A careful examination of the real situation should be required before 
implementing any policy. 
We attempt to apply the models to examine the Hong Kong economy. Until the 
1970s, the abundant labor supply gives Hong Kong a comparative advantage in 
producing labor intensive goods. That the high tech industry is too primitive to be 
competitive in the international market is another crucial point in explaining why Hong 
Kong specialized in producing traditional manufacturing goods before the 1970s. 
However, Hong Kong has experienced stagnant growth in labor supply since the � 
1970s. It is equivalent to a drop in labor capital endowment ratio. The high tech 
industry becomes viable in Hong Kong. This opportunity notwithstanding, the high 
tech industry cannot be established without any coordination policy. Put another way, 
Hong Kong may encounter-coordination failure discussed in earlier chapters. In earlier 
discussion, public provision of higher education, trade policy and production subsidy, 
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subsidizing investment in human capital and specific physical capital are the possible 
measures in facilitating the establishment of the high tech industry although they may 
sometimes cause distortion. As we have seen, trade policy and production subsidy and 
investment subsidy are not in the policy agenda for Hong Kong government although 
higher education is heavily subsidized. Nevertheless,, the development of the high tech 
industry cannot be regarded as satisfactory. 
Thanks to China's open door policy, the Hong Kong businessmen are given a 
new investment opportunity. A lot of capital was moved north and invested in 
production there. This massive capital outflow brought a rise in labor capital 
endowment ratio which may induce Hong Kong to become free of coordination failure. 
The underlying principle is that investment in the outward processing production is 
more profitable than in the high tech industry. This makes the high tech industry not 
viable again. Concern about coordination failure therefore becomes unnecessary. 
Last but not least, we only offer a possible reason to explain why the high tech 
industry cannot be established. This reflects that it is implausible to explore all possible 
reasons in one model. Undeniably, other possibilities are of same importance in 
explaining the failure of the setup of the high tech industry. 
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